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1Sowing the seeds of sustainable rural livelihoods? 
An assessment of Participatory Forest Management through 
REDD+ in Tanzania
Abstract 
Participatory forest management (PFM) initiatives have emerged worldwide for a range of 
aims including to improve forest governance, enhance resource conservation and to increase 
rural people’s access to and benefits from forest resources. Some of these initiatives have also 
received climate finance support to enhance their impact on mitigation. However, their effects 
on forest governance and livelihoods are complex and remain poorly studied. In this article, 
we address this gap by analysing governance and livelihood changes in a PFM initiative in 
Tanzania that has received funding as a REDD+ pilot site. Based on qualitative governance 
analysis and quantitative livelihood panel data (2011-2014) that compares villages and 
households within and outside the project, we find that improvements to forest governance are 
substantial in project villages compared to control villages, while changes in income have 
been important but statistically insignificant, and driven by a regional sesame cash crop boom 
unrelated to enhanced forestry revenues. Focusing on whether PFM had enhanced other 
wealth indicators including household conditions and durable assets, our analysis shows again 
no significant differences between participant and control villages, although the participant 
villages do have, on average, a greater level of durable assets. Overall, our findings are 
positive regarding forest governance improvements but inconclusive regarding livelihood 
effects, which at least in the short term seem to benefit more from agricultural intensification 
than forestry activities, whose benefits might become more apparent over a longer time 
period. In conclusion we emphasize the need for moving towards longer term monitoring 
efforts, improving understandings of local dynamics of change, particularly at a regional 
rather than community level, and defining the most appropriate outcome variables and cost-
effective systems of data collection or optimization of existing datasets if we are to better 
capture the complex impacts of PFM initiatives worldwide.
Keywords
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21. Introduction
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) emerged in the late 1970s in response to the 
degradation of government owned forests, partly explained by inadequate financial and 
human resources, and in order to grant or devolve formal management rights to local 
communities (Arnold 2001). PFM has been commonly built upon legal reforms establishing 
the foundations for forest rights devolution and benefit sharing, and it has been implemented 
by governments or non-governmental organisations, sometimes partnering with local 
communities. PFM has been considered critical to shift from top-down, government-based 
initiatives to community-led participatory forest management, with the aim to protect and 
improve forest quality and people’s livelihoods. 
In Tanzania, where this study is located, the Forest Act of 2002 allows two types of PFM. The 
first type is Joint Forest Management (JFM), which usually takes place within government-
owned forests and where management responsibilities are shared between government and 
communities. JFM has proved problematic due to the slow progress in agreeing benefit 
sharing terms between the government and collaborating communities. The second type is 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM), which takes place on village lands and where 
communities have the right to 100% of PFM benefits and are not obliged to share 
management responsibilities or returns with external actors such as local or national 
government. Community-based PFM covered 23.3% of Tanzania’s forestland in 2012, 
involved 2285 villages (MNRT 2012) and it is the focus of this article.
Environmental measures of PFM success, such as basal area and timber volume, have been 
found to increase in Tanzanian PFM forests, whereas those under open access and state 
management experienced declines in both (Blomley et al. 2008). It has also been found that 
community-based PFM can reduce illegal logging more significantly than JFM or 
government-centralised forest management, although its effectiveness in halting subsistence 
tree cutting can be equally limited (Persha and Blomley 2009). A more recent impact 
evaluation of JFM across the country also suggests that JFM has not been effective in halting 
forest degradation and deforestation, but has slowed forest degradation when compared with 
forests without a management regime. The analysis reveals that the strongest positive impact 
of JFM has been on the creation of local governance institutions (Persha and Meshack 2016).
Evidence of the social benefits of PFM in Tanzania, including JFM and community-based 
PFM, is somewhat less positive. Despite improvements in forest management institutions, 
3there is typically low income from forest management due to lack of high value products, and 
even these small benefits are often captured disproportionately by elites (Meshack et al. 2006; 
Vyamana 2009), albeit exceptions have been documented (McDermott and Schreckenberg 
2009). PFM schemes have involved opportunities and costs for communities, in terms of 
foregone forest use, transaction costs of deliberations, and institutional time commitments for 
forest management operations (Merger et al. 2012). For the average villager, PFM might 
mean unwelcome additional work in return for often minimal benefits, at worst a situation 
that might only be sustained because it remains in the interest of the elite minority whose will 
prevails (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006). Additionally, PFM has sometimes become the 
means through which local elites have reinforced their privileges and acquired (more) power, 
specifically through the administration of their participation in and the knowledge of PFM 
governance institutions for their own economic and political advantage (Green and Lund 
2015). This relative paucity of tangible livelihood benefits, coupled with the weak governance 
of what benefits there might be and who might reap those, poses a critical problem for the 
expansion and sustainability of PFM (Burgess et al. 2010; Mustalahti and Lund 2010; Gross-
Camp 2017). 
Understanding the impacts of PFM programs and projects has become even more critical with 
the advent of the international framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation, and for the enhancement, sustainable management and conservation of 
forest stocks (REDD+), established under the auspices of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). REDD+ encourages countries in the global 
South to re-organise their land-use and forest governance in order to reduce the sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions contributions. Until now, REDD+ has mobilized millions from 
donor countries through World Bank and UN dedicated platforms (e.g. the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD programme), as well as through bilateral agreements 
(e.g. Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)) to support policies and 
implementation efforts in developing countries. 
Tanzania started to prepare for REDD+, including the development of its national REDD+ 
strategy, in 2008, and it has since hosted eight pilot projects (Campese 2012). Independent 
research in these projects points at shared concerns and challenges. Vatn et al. (2017), for 
example, examine one pilot in the country’s Morogoro region and highlight that building 
institutions to trade carbon is time-consuming and can only be inclusive and legitimate if 
properly designed. They argue that the latter was challenging because some resource users, 
4particularly charcoal makers, considered the project detrimental to their interests and internal 
conflicts ensued as a result. Scheba and Rakotonarivo (2016) examine another project in the 
Lindi region and they also find that, despite well-intentioned NGO efforts for including all 
villagers in project development, conflicts emerged over the demarcation of village forest 
reserves, which changed existing resource access relations, and over the distribution of project 
economic revenues, which were perceived as unfair by some households. Khatun et al. 
(2015b) identify similar procedural and distributional concerns in four of the villages included 
in this article, and indicate the challenges that villagers face when trying to protect forests and 
secure “carbon stocks” against external actors and threats (Khatun, Corbera, and Ball 2016). 
The existence of such operational flaws, and the juxtaposition of REDD+ efforts with the 
formerly existing community-based PFM model, has led some critics to argue that PFM and 
REDD+ in Tanzania follow “the logic of the development and conservation industry more 
generally, which continuously produces and feeds off the development and testing of new 
policy models” (Lund et al. 2017, 133). These models generate expectations about income 
gains and development that are almost never met.
This article contributes to these debates about the social impacts of PFM and the risks of 
using PFM as a platform for REDD+ implementation (Robinson et al. 2013) by analysing the 
impacts of a PFM/REDD+ pilot project on community-based forest governance and 
households’ livelihoods, including households’ income, assets, and their participation in and 
knowledge of project activities. The studied project combines PFM efforts with REDD+ 
preparedness finance in the district of Kilwa, south-eastern Tanzania. Our analysis 
encompasses four villages where PFM has been fully established, timber sold, and additional 
REDD+ activities have been conducted, and another five villages where PFM has not been 
established but REDD+ activities have started. We examine the project’s impacts through an 
analysis of forest governance institutions and household conditions before-and-after project 
implementation, using nearby non-MCDI villages that have no PFM or REDD+ activities in 
place as a control group.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two introduces the case study in 
greater detail and develops the methods and data analysis techniques used to evaluate the 
impact of the studied project on local forest governance and livelihoods. Section three 
presents the results organised around three main sections: the project’s effects on forest 
governance at village level; on households’ wealth indicators, particularly income and 
material assets, and on households’ perceptions of project fairness, including participation in 
5project activities, and distribution of project fees and related knowledge. Section four 
discusses the results, and section five concludes the article.
2. Case study and methods
2.1. Combining PFM and REDD+ in Kilwa, Tanzania
MCDI is a Tanzanian NGO that promotes the sustainable management of high-value timber 
trees, including the flagship East African Blackwood (Dalbergia melanoxylon, locally known 
as Mpingo), through community-based PFM village schemes across the Kilwa district, in the 
Lindi region (Map 1). Kilwa is one of the most densely forested districts in Tanzania, with 
forests and woodlands covering around 70% of the land. The forests are a complex mosaic of 
miombo woodlands and patches of East African Coastal Forests. MCDI started working in the 
district in 2004, laying the groundwork for PFM in four villages that gained group 
certification from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 2009 and 2010 (Khatun et al. 
2015a). In 2009, MCDI also started activities linked to a pilot REDD+ intervention, building 
on PFM institutions to generate carbon offsets through fire management (Khatun, Corbera, 
and Ball 2016). MCDI is now active in ten villages and its objectives are to expand and 
improve PFM for sustainable forest management, generate new sources of income for 
communities and support villagers’ development aspirations.
Map 1. Case study villages 
6Source: elaborated with cartographic data from GDAM and Digital Chart of the World repositories and geo-
referenced information provided by MCDI.
The MCDI project is built around three components. The first focuses on PFM development, 
which encompasses i) village meetings for the preparation of the PFM plan, which involves 
the approval of local forest management by-laws and defining boundaries of a Village Land 
Forest Reserve (VLFR), from which timber can be sustainably extracted, and ii) the setup of a 
Village Natural Resource Committee (VNRC), which complements the existing Village 
Council (VC) and acts as the overseeing authority of forest management rules and the 
7conservation of the VLFR. The second component involves activities to obtain FSC 
certification and facilitation of logging and timber sales, with MCDI providing advice to 
village institutions on how to manage timber revenues fairly. As highlighted in Table 1 
(column 7), only four villages have sold timber to date and the revenues generated were 
invested and distributed differently in each village. Some money was invested collectively on 
public health infrastructure, and the rest split across community and VNRC households for 
different purposes as decided by the  –see (Khatun et al. 2015a) for details on this issue-. 
Finally, the third component, funded by NICFI between 2010 and 2015 as a REDD+ pilot 
scheme, has consisted of meetings and activities to request Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) and develop controlled early burning trials as activities to generate marketable carbon 
offsets certified through a Voluntary Carbon Standard methodology, and not yet sold. In the 
future, a share of the revenues generated by verified carbon offsets will be distributed to 
villages through their formal institutions, the VC and the VNRC. MCDI has rewarded 
households economically for their participation in each activity related to this component1.  
The research presented in this article was developed across nine project and six control 
villages, respectively (Table 1). Four of the nine project villages (hereafter referred as early 
entry villages) had benefited from timber sales in the years prior to the introduction of 
REDD+ activities (i.e. before 2010), and they had signed a REDD+ agreement with MCDI 
and piloted controlled early burning activities. The other five (hereafter referred as late entry 
villages) had signed the REDD+ agreement and developed controlled early burning activities 
but had not yet fully developed their PFM/FSC processes. Given these differences, it is 
important to understand, first, that early entry villages and their households have 
economically benefitted from MCDI activities more than late entry villages due to their 
access to both timber and REDD+ related project revenues and, second, that the relative 
impact of MCDI activities on households’ income can vary significantly, since the flow of 
timber and (future) carbon revenue to the households is influenced by decisions made by 
village institutions, while flows derived from project activities depend on the household’s 
effective access to the latter.
The six control villages were selected for the livelihood analysis, since they had no PFM or 
other REDD+ related efforts in place and they had no contact with MCDI or other forest 
1 Households receive different levels of fees, depending on the type of meeting attended or project activity 
conducted: a) attending MCDI meetings 3000 TSh/day; b) Marking VLFR boundaries 7000 Tsh/day; c) 
Patrolling VLFR boundaries 7000 Tsh/day; d) Clearing VLFR boundaries 7000 Tsh/day; e) Harvesting FSC 
timber & REDD+ early burning trials 10000 Tsh/day.
8management and conservation projects alike. Following consultation with MCDI staff with 
extensive local experience, the two most important criteria for selecting village controls were 
population size and proximity to the main highway to Dar es Salaam. Population size effects 
the demand pressure on forests as well as the dynamics of local self-organisation. Proximity 
to the highway also determines pressure on forests (via transport costs to market) and 
remoteness can be a determinant of poverty.
9Table 1. Characterisation of case study villages
Village Name MCDI association
Population 
(2008)
Participants 
in governance 
focus group 
(N>202 * 2)
Households 
sample (N=452) Timber sales
REDD+ 
preparation
Kikole PFM 2004; FSC 2009 1,271 14 30
2009. 41.9% share of timber proceeds 
invested in the midwife’s house; remaining 
invested in forest patrolling activities of the 
VNRC and other household members.
Conducted early 
burning in the 
VLFR in 2014
Kisangi PFM 2005; FSC 2009 847 17 28
2011. 34.8% share of timber proceeds 
invested in the medic’s house; remaining 
proceeds spent on VNRC patrolling and 
boundary clearing activities.
Conducted early 
burning in the 
VLFR in 2014
Liwiti PFM 2009;FSC 2010 238 14 25
2011. 54.9% share of timber proceeds 
invested in school building; remaining 
proceeds spent on VNRC patrolling and 
boundary clearing activities.
Conducted early 
burning in the 
VLFR in 2014
Early entry 
villages, i.e. 
PFM/FSC 
activities + 
preparing for 
REDD+
(N=113)
Nainokwe PFM 2009; FSC 2010 386 14 30
2011. 61.5% of timber proceeds invested in 
the new house for the Village Executive 
Officer; remaining share allocated to cover 
the medical insurance or school meals of 
specific households, and the rest transferred 
to all households to cover the costs of 
accessing bank account in nearby town.
Conducted early 
burning in the 
VLFR in 2013 
and 2014
Likawage
REDD+ 
preparation 
since
2010
2,638 13 30 None
Conducted early 
burning trial in 
2013, and 
conducted early 
burning in the 
VLFR in 2014 
Late entry 
villages, i.e. 
only preparing 
for REDD+ and 
not yet any 
timber sales or 
FSC certified
(N=166) Mandawa
REDD+ 
preparation 
since 2010
4,132 15 29 None
Project meetings 
held but no early 
burning trial 
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Village Name MCDI association
Population 
(2008)
Participants 
in governance 
focus group 
(N>202 * 2)
Households 
sample (N=452) Timber sales
REDD+ 
preparation
conducted at the 
time of research
Mchakama
REDD+ 
preparation 
since 2010
1,313 15 29 None
Project meetings 
held but no early 
burning trial 
conducted at the 
time of research
Mitole REDD+ planned 2,730 15 28 None
Project meetings 
held but no early 
burning trial 
conducted at the 
time of research
Ngea
REDD+ 
preparation 
since 2010
Not 
available 13 20 None
Conducted early 
burning trial in 
2013
Mtyalambuko None 1,923 N/A 29 N/A N/A
Ngorongoro None Not available N/A 30 N/A N/A
Nakiu None 1703 N/A 30 N/A N/A
Mtandi None 719 N/A 30 N/A N/A
Nandete None 3395 N/A 28 N/A N/A
Control villages 
(only used for 
household 
survey)
(N=173)
Mbwemkuru None 1243 N/A 26 N/A N/A
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2.2. Analysing MCDI outcomes
To analyse the project’s expected changes in village forest governance, we drafted a set of 
governance criteria and questions with associated thresholds for scoring, and then validated 
them with a sample of elected authorities in both project and control villages in November 
2010 (Table A in Supplementary Information). We held a focus group in each village to agree 
on a scoring for each governance criteria between November 2011 and February 2012. We 
repeated such exercise with the same participants in January-February 2014 (Table 1). Before 
the first round, we invited village households to attend the focus group in advance, but only 
an average of 15 people showed up in the project villages. Among the participants, there were 
usually more men than women, and a few were always formal members of village institutions, 
such as the VNRC or the VC. 
We acknowledge that the social composition of the focus groups can be seen as a caveat and 
as a limitation of our research, and we are thus aware that our governance-related findings 
should be treated with caution and better explored in the future. Given limited time and 
resources, we did not pursue the development of other focus groups, stratified according to 
gender, resource user groups, or involvement in village institutions, for example. However, as 
our results below will demonstrate, the possible bias of our focus groups towards elites and 
people who were genuinely interested in the issues to be discussed during the focus group has 
not precluded us from collecting negative performance scores and critical reflections by 
participants about what works and what does not at village level. 
During the focus groups, the governance criteria were introduced one at a time by the authors 
and by MCDI staff who were fluent in English and Swahili, and they were subsequently 
discussed at length. Participants were asked to reflect on performance in relation to each 
criterion and question, and a grade (+/~/-) was agreed according to indicated judgements and 
thresholds for each of these grades (Table A in Supplementary Information). Deliberations 
were rich and the process worked reasonably well, with little apparent problem of elite 
domination or misrepresentation. Overall, the process generated a simple qualitative grade for 
each question, which were then combined into an overall grade for the correspondent 
governance criteria (Table 2). 
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To investigate the direct effects on households’ income, the indirect effects on other wealth 
indicators and the level of knowledge about PFM and other project activities we used a 
household questionnaire. The household was the unit of study and we required two 
respondents for each questionnaire, a man and a woman. In most cases, this was husband and 
wife. The questionnaire was piloted first and deployed in November 2011 and February 2012, 
while the second round of data collection took place during the first half of 2014. Data were 
collected by a team of MCDI staff, who were trained by UEA staff before each round of data 
collection, and enumerators were fluent in both English and Swahili.
Before deploying the questionnaire, we classified all existing households in each village 
across three classes of wealth (ie. rich, medium, low wealth), according to their existing 
household assets and based on information provided by village authorities. We then randomly 
selected from each class of households in proportions that represented the profile for the 
village as a whole. We aimed for at least a 20% sample of households in each village, but 
given budget constraints we introduced a maximum limit of 30 households for each village. 
We surveyed a total of 452 households twice and findings should thus be treated with caution 
since our sample represents approximately only 10% of the possible sample.
The questionnaire collected data on the demographic and education profile of household 
members; housing conditions and durable assets; agricultural cultivation area and crop types; 
livestock assets; PFM and project activities’ knowledge levels; and expenditure and income 
activities and amounts over the previous year, including agricultural and livestock sales and 
average forest product sales. Reported income and expenditure data were recorded in 
Tanzanian shillings and we adjusted 2014 data for inflation. We did so using Tanzania's 
Consumer Price Index for July 2011 (CPI index = 112.7) and March 2014 (CPI index = 
149.49), a roughly 33% increase in prices in less than two years that is likely to have affected 
households in a range of ways. These dates were chosen because they were approximately in 
the middle of each data collection period. To adjust for inflation, we then multiplied 2014 
income data by 112.7/149.49, i.e. 0.753.
Collected data were compiled in an Excel database and each household was coded to identify 
the village, the number and the wealth category it originally belonged to. In this way, we 
facilitated the pairing of households in the analysis of change between 2011 and 2014. The 
database was cleaned and analysed using STATA 12.1 to have a consistent account of the 
data management performed and use 95% confidence intervals throughout the analysis. 
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Following Hadi (1992, 1994)2, variable outliers were identified and not accounted for when 
distilling ‘average’ results for key variables. For example, the value of ‘average total income’ 
per village does not necessarily result from the sum of discrete income categories, such as 
‘subsistence crops income’, ‘cash crops income’, ‘forest products’ income, since the outliers 
identified for each of these categories result in a different sample size to calculate sub- and 
total income averages. 
When collecting data, we confronted a set of challenges and also made some adjustments. 
First, we had several missing data for children and adults’ age in both survey rounds which 
meant we could not calculate the household’s dependency ratio, critical to assess if most 
dependent households were benefitting more or less than others from project activities. 
However, we developed a ‘modified dependency ratio’ based on the number of adults fit to 
work and total number of members in the household, expressed as percentage. This provided 
us with key information on the pressure experienced by households to maintain their 
livelihoods, with lower ratios (e.g. <25%) reflecting a higher livelihood burden on adults fit to 
work than higher ones (e.g. >75%).
The ‘housing quality index’ was developed using a simple weighting scheme based on 
previous fieldwork knowledge. Therefore, ‘grass walls’ (1 point) were weighted lower than 
‘mud walls’ (2 points) and this lower than ‘brick walls’ (3 point) and rendered ‘cement walls’ 
(4 points). The same logic was applied to floors, doors and roofs and their different possible 
configurations. The minimum index value was four points, and the maximum 11. The amount 
of durable assets in each household was a simple count variable, summing up the amount of 
observed assets present in each household. These included solar panels, cars, motorbikes, 
bicycles, televisions, radios, mobile phones or other goods worth more than a phone.
Collecting data on cultivated land proved challenging in the case of cashew-cultivating 
farmers because some would provide us with the number of cultivated trees and were unable 
to translate this into land area. Therefore, we applied a conversion factor from trees to acreage 
size based on recommended planting densities for southern Tanzania of 69 trees/ha, i.e. 
approx. 28 trees/acre (Martin et al., 1997, p. 12). We thus multiplied the number of trees 
noted by farmers by a factor of 0.0358. 
2 Hadi proposes a series of steps to find outliers by calculating the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the 
mean or to a chosen “center” point. These distances follow a chi-square distribution which is used to test the 
hypothesis that certain observations might constitute outliers.
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To discern the project’s direct effect on income or durable assets, we estimated poisson (for 
durable goods) and OLS (for income and expenditure) ‘difference-in-difference’ models 
comparing households in project villages with controls. Difference in difference models allow 
to ‘average out’ time constant unobservable characteristics that might be influencing both the 
participation in the program or project and the outcome of interest (Donald and Lang 2007). 
Three dependent variables were used to investigate the possible effect of the MCDI project: 
‘total income’; ‘total monthly expenditure’ and ‘total amount of durable assets’. For each 
dependent variable three different types of comparisons were made. In the first one, early 
entry and late entry villages were grouped together and compared against control villages. In 
the second analysis, control villages were dropped to compare early entry against late entry 
villages. Finally, in the third analysis, all villages were grouped together and compared. 
We also added relevant control variables that we thought to be related to changes in our 
dependent variables and which would allow us to reduce potential biases in our ‘difference-
in-difference’ estimator. In this way, we hoped to get cleaner estimates of the changes in our 
dependent variables resulting from the MCDI project. These independent variables included: 
‘household size’, ‘modified dependency ratio’, ‘highest education level reported’, ‘total land 
acreage’, ‘number of fruit trees’, ‘number of livestock’ and ‘percentage of land used for 
sesame production’, ‘income from crops’ and ‘income from forest products’. We decided to 
report our results using bootstrapped standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani 1986) and to 
evaluate those based on the distribution of our empirical data –the results did not change 
using robust standard errors.
We found significant positive correlations at 95% confidence level between total land acreage 
and income, durable assets, the housing quality index and household size for 2011 and 2014 
in both early and late entry villages, as well as for controls, except for the relationship 
between land acreage and household size in controls for 2011, which proved non-significant. 
This demonstrates data consistency and suggests that improvements in these variables are 
related to each other with more or less intensity.
3. Results
3.1. Changes in forest governance at village level
Evidence gathered through the focus groups indicated that the project had an overall positive 
effect on forest governance during the study period (Table 2), including social cohesion and 
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organisation, decision-making quality and knowledge about PFM and project activities more 
generally, and this was particularly significant in early entry villages where MCDI had been 
working longer. Three of these four villages showed very significant improvements across 
just about all criteria and indicators discussed in the focus group. The exception was Liwiti, 
which was initially the strongest but was at the time of our second focus group facing a 
conflict that reduced what was previously the best performance (see Khatun et al. 2015, pp. 
2103). 
As regards organisation and level of social cohesion, early entry villages maintained a good 
standard between 2011 and 2014, but performed relatively poorly regarding communication 
and awareness criteria due to their limited understanding of REDD+ during the second focus 
group. These villages also showed improved performance regarding decision-making, 
reflecting the effect of project management activities on improved deliberation procedures. 
Seemingly, they improved their already relatively good performance on forest management 
indicators, which resulted from demarcating VLFR boundaries and effective forest protection. 
They also scored well for fund development reflecting good village dynamism around 
revenue generation and allocation. 
Of the late entry villages involved in REDD+ preparedness, but which had not yet sold any 
FSC certified timber, four improved their overall performance over time but such 
improvement was low. None was facing fundamental conflicts, with the exception of 
Mchakama, where practical forest management was problematic. As regards communication 
and social cohesion, their performance improved over the study period but villagers 
complained about certain constraints to full participation, including limitations on awareness 
and understanding of project activities, particularly for households outside the main village. 
Their knowledge about the PFM project and the REDD+ component was poor, and remained 
so over the years. As a result, in late entry villages, focus group participants complained about 
poor recording of decisions and limited follow-up of adopted decisions. These villages were 
all suffering relatively poor forest management, which significantly reduced people’s 
perceived access to forest products. There was little use of revenues for local development 
activities in late entry villages, which we argued earlier is logical since they had not seen any 
substantial timber or carbon offset revenues arriving.
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Table 2. Forest governance criteria scores in project villages
PFM/FSC villages REDD villages
Criteria
 K
ik
ol
e
K
is
an
gi
L
iw
iti
N
ai
no
kw
e
L
ik
aw
ag
e
M
an
da
w
a
M
ch
ak
am
a
M
ito
le
N
ge
a
Year 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11 14
1. User organization & Cohesion +/~ + + + + +/~ + + + ~ +/~ + ~ +/~ ~/- ~ ~ +
2. Communication & Awareness + ~ ~ ~ +/~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~/- - ~/- - ~/- - ~/-
3. Decision-making & 
Implementation ~ +/~ ~ ~ ~ ~ +/~ +/~ ~ +/~ ~ +/~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~
4. Forest Management +/~ + ~ + + + ~ + - + ~/- ~ - - - ~ ~/- ~
5. Forest product access & 
distribution ~ + ~ + +/~ +/~ + + ~ + +/~ +/~ + + + +/~ + +
6. Gender and Equity 
Considerations ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ + ~
7. Economic / Fund development +/~ + + + +/~ + ~ + - - + na + - ~ - - -
8. Conflict management ~/- + ~/- + + ~ - + ~ + +/~ + +/~ + + + + +
9. Linkage and network 
development ~ ~ - ~ ~ + +/~ +/~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~/- - ~ - ~
Overall score (∑scores) 2 5.5 0.5 5.0 4.5 3.0 2.0 6.0 -1.0 2.5 3 2.5 -1.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -1.5 1.5
Legend: + good; +/~ moderately good; ~ moderate; ~/- moderately poor; - poor. Overall score is added on the basis of + = 1 point; +/~ = 0.5; ~  = 0; ~/- = -0.5; - = -1 point. 
Underlined scores for 2014 indicate improvement. 
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None of the nine villages performed well on gender and equity considerations (see 3.3. for 
more detail on these issues at household level), although they did not score very negatively 
either: in general, the decision-making deliberations around forest management issues were 
observed to be primarily male dominated and women were very sparsely included.  By 
inference their views were not incorporated directly. 
3.2. Changes in housing conditions, durable assets and income
Figure 1 shows that all surveyed villages had similar average housing quality index values, 
with standard deviations of around 0.9 points in 2011 and of around 1.3 points in 2014. We 
did not find any striking differences in housing conditions across our sampled households. 
This index slightly increased in value across villages between 2011 and 2014, except for one 
early entry village (Kisangi), one late entry (Mchakama) and two controls (Mtyalambuko and 
Nandete), which experienced minimal decreases that might be explained by data collection 
inconsistencies. The small overall increase coupled with relatively higher standard deviations 
found in 2014 compared to 2011 suggests that some households improved their housing 
conditions while others had mostly continued with the same conditions. On average, housing 
conditions had not improved more in MCDI-supported villages than in controls.
Figure 1. Housing quality index by village groups and year 
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Again, we did not observe significant differences in the average number of goods held by 
households across surveyed villages, and neither across participant and controls. Nonetheless, 
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we found a trend towards an increased number of assets (Figure 2). Higher standard 
deviations found in data from 2014 also suggest that intra-village inequality in the number of 
durable assets between those with more and fewer goods had increased. In all but one of the 
control villages the share of households with 5 or more durable assets increased between 2011 
and 2014 at the expense of the category with two to four durable assets, which should be 
regarded as a positive trend from a material poverty reduction perspective. However, in some 
early entry (Kikole, Nainokwe) and control villages (Mbwemkuro, Mtyalambuko and 
Ngorongoro), the average number of households in the zero to one goods category increased. 
This suggests that the poorest households, across all village types, had found it difficult to 
increase their assets, irrespectively of PFM and REDD+ activities.
Figure 2. Average durable assets by village groups and year 
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Reported average income levels from selling subsistence crops, i.e. maize, millet and rice, by 
village groups in 2011 were lower in early entry and control than in late entry villages. 
However, there were very high standard deviations, which indicated a high disparity in 
income derived from these crops. By 2014, most households across all villages –except for 
Mtyalambuko- reported that they had not gained any income from sales. This was due to the 
fact that most villages in 2014 obtained their agricultural income exclusively from cash crops. 
Additionally, the overall production of subsistence crops in 2013 was poorer than in 2010 due 
to meteorological conditions, which also explained why there was a higher shortage of 
subsistence crops available for sale in 2014 (Table B in Supplementary Information). 
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In contrast, average income derived from cash crops, including sesame and cashew, increased 
across early entry and late entry village groups during the study period, and it diminished 
slightly in controls. Total cash income became dominated by sales of sesame (and cashew to a 
lesser extent). Early and late entry villages showed higher cash crop income averages, but 
standard deviations were very high and above the mean. On average, MCDI-supported 
villages derived more income from cash crops over the study period. It is also worth noting 
that, after accounting for inflation, cash crop income levels for 2014 decreased slightly in 
Nainokwe and in all control villages except Mbwemkuru (Table C in Supplementary 
Information).
In 2011, we found a positive and statistically significant correlation between the proportion of 
acres dedicated to sesame and cashew cultivation and total household income for many early 
and late entry villages (Kisangi, Likawage, Mandawa, Mitole, Ngea), as well as controls 
(Mbwemkuru, Mtandi and Ngorongoro). In 2014, it was only found positive for an early entry 
village (Kikole) and three controls (Mtyalambuko, Nandete and Ngorongoro). We also found 
a positive correlation between the proportion of land under sesame and cashew and total 
agricultural income that was statistically significant for 2011 across five project villages and 
two controls, which in 2014 was significant only for Kikole, Likawage, Nandete and 
Ngorongoro. It is likely that such relationships were not significant in other villages due to 
three possible reasons: the fact that 2013 was a drought year with poor harvest might have 
considerably reduced the reported income from cash crops in these other villages, falling 
sharply in comparison to the amount of land dedicated to their cultivation; possible flaws in 
income data; and the reduced number of observations in our sample (Table D in 
Supplementary Information).
Reported income for forest products, including ropes, grass, honey, wildmeat, logs and 
charcoal, was low but increased considerably between years (Table E in Supplementary 
Information). This runs against our expectation that forest products extraction and related 
income would get reduced over time as a result of VLFRs establishment. However, this was 
not the case for at least two reasons: 1) the VLFRs encompassed a rather small proportion of 
total village lands and forests, which means that their demarcation has not constrained access 
to the forests –at least from surveyed households-; and 2) we were able to collect better data 
on the second round –with fewer missing values as a result of increasing confidence with 
MCDI staff and enumerators, which translated in higher income levels being reported. 
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Table 3 summarises the levels of average annual income both across years and across 
villages. early entry villages’ average annual income in 2011 was approximately 373,500 Tsh, 
increasing up to approximately 492,400 Tsh in 2014. For both years, standard deviations were 
close to or greater than the mean, which reflects a large variation in reported incomes. A 
similar growth in average income can be observed in late entry villages, increasing from 
353,800 Tsh in 2011 to 477,000 Tsh in 2014, with standard deviations exceeding the 
correspondent means. Annual average household income in control villages was similar to 
participant villages in 2011, i.e. 317,021 Tsh, and it had not increased much in 2014, i.e. 
318,308 Tsh. Standard deviations in control villages were also above the mean. Table 3 also 
shows consistency in the data for individual villages across time, with most villages’ relative 
average income position -except for Nandete- not changing much in the two surveyed years. 
Average income inequality by village group and year revealed an increase in early entry 
villages (acutely if we accounted for outliers) during the study period, while it remained very 
similar in late entry and control villages (Table 4). Among project villages, the Gini 
coefficient only diminished in Kisangi and in Mandawa for 2014, while in control villages 
such coefficient diminished for Mtyalambuko, Nandete and Ngorongoro (Figure F in 
Supplementary Information). Such increasing income inequality echoes the widening gap 
observed in durable asset counts within some villages, and irrespective of MCDI presence. 
Figure 3 shows that most villages present very similar expenditure averages for 2011 and 
2014, oscillating between 30,000 and 50,000 Tsh. However, reported monthly expenditure 
levels in control villages were somewhat higher for both years across the six villages. Most 
money was spent on clothes, labour, education, medicines, trips to town and food related 
items, including mostly maize, millet and rice, followed by sugar and cooking oil (Figure 4). 
This indicates that most households are not food secure from a subsistence cropping 
perspective and that they rely on local markets to meet their food annual requirements. 
Importantly, the rise in expenditure of basic staples in 2014 also meshes with the change in 
income data for staple crops reported above, confirming that harvests in 2013 were poor and 
that many households moved from a surplus of subsistence crops to a deficit. Unfortunately, 
the households who reported accessing MCDI project monies over the study period (see 
section 3.3) were unable to indicate how they had used such revenues, and they noted that 
PFM revenues were spent it in whatever was needed at the time they became available.
Figure 3. Mean reported monthly expenditure by village and year
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Figure 4. Percentage of expenditure per items by village group and year 
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In our attempt to discern the MCDI project’s effects on income and assets, respectively, Table 
5 presents the results for our three ‘difference-in-difference’ models controlling for relevant 
variables. The row ‘Wave’ indicates the change between years for each of the three dependent 
variables across all surveyed households. In other words, it is the coefficient indicating the 
average change from 2011 to 2014 without taking into account participation in MCDI 
activities. The row ‘Treatment’ indicates the difference between households surveyed in 
MCDI villages and households from control villages, irrespective of the year surveyed. The 
row ‘Difference-in-Difference estimator’ is the value of interest because it tells us how 
different the households in MCDI villages are in 2014 in comparison to the households in 
control villages, as well as how they had changed across surveyed years. 
The coefficient for ‘Wave’ indicates the average change from 2011 to 2014 without taking 
into account participation in MCDI activities. The coefficient for ‘Treatment’ indicates the 
difference between households surveyed in MCDI villages and households from control 
villages, irrespective of the year surveyed. The coefficient for the ‘Difference-in-Difference 
estimator’ is the value of interest because it tells us how different the households in MCDI 
villages are in 2014 in comparison to the households in control villages, as well as how they 
had changed across surveyed years. In other words, this coefficient reflects if the change in 
our dependent variables can be attributed to the MCDI project.
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Table 3. Mean household income (Tsh) by village group, village and year (mean, standard deviation and sample size, respectively. 2014 
data deflated using Consumer Price Index changes
Summary Results (Tsh) Village Mean (Tsh)
Group
2011 2014 Village 2011 2014
Early Entry 373,504(± 369,240, n=113)
492,432
(± 591,496, n=101)
Kikole
Kisangi
Liwiti
Nainokwe
478,225
284,443
395,348
275,540
596,757
520,385
601,447
248,496
Late Entry 353,825(± 465,294, n=136)
477,049
(± 566,345, n=124)
Likawage
Mandawa
Mchakama
Mitole
Ngea
553,950
401,663
231,838
323,365
181,300
585,675
610,617
393,649
499,938
245,953
Control 317,021(± 422,854, n=130)
318,308
(± 435,128, n=166)
Mbwemkuru
Mtandi
Mtyalambuko
Nakiu
Nandete
Ngorongoro
342,500
359,350
227,345
525,020
179,643
161,517
522,256
271,584
246,217
590,929
128,950
153,230
Table 4. Gini coefficient by village group and year
2011 2014 2011 2014
Early Entry 0.52 0.61 0,59 0,87
Late Entry 0.58 0.61 0,63 0,64
Control 0.62 0.65 0,67 0,67
Outliers (N=40) discarded Outliers (N=40) included
Note: coefficients have been calculated discarding all outliers found across all income categories (agriculture, livestock, forest, and other income sources).
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Table 5. “Difference in difference” analysis for MCDI activities' impact on livelihoods
Model 1: Early+Late Entry versus Control villages Model 2: Early versus Late Entry villages Model 3: Early / Late versus Control villages
                              (1) DurablesPoisson
(2) Expenditure
OLS
(3) Total Income
OLS
(4) Durables
Poison
(5) Expenditure
OLS
(6) Total Income
OLS
(7) Durables
Poisson
(8) Expenditure
OLS
(9) Total Income
OLS
Wave                          0,064 -6,921 97,208** 0,003 -4,164 106,073 0,063 -6,9 95,976**
Treatment 0,163* 1,022 66,716**
Difference-in-Difference estimator (Early+Late 
Entry versus Control villages) -0,174 7,078 -30,854
Early versus Late Entry villages 0,069 -4,901 17,563
Difference-in-Difference estimator (Early versus 
Late Entry villages) -0,143 12,243 -41,673
Early                         0,21** -2,23 76,425**
Late                          0,122 4,178 57,78*
Difference-in-Difference estimator (Early Entry 
versus Control villages) -0,273** 12,78 -50,584
Difference in Difference estimator (Late Entry 
versus Control villages) -0,063 1,086 -6,492
Household Size 0,018 0,783 -8,95 0,046*** 1,477 -3,968 0,018 0,773 -8,89
Dependency Ratio 0,098 -3,17 -12,715 -0,154* -4,504 -15,113 0,098 -3,205 -12,919
Max. Educ. Level 0,067*** 2,605*** 21,092*** 0,06*** 2,517*** 20,877** 0,067*** 2,621*** 21,034***
Total Crops Acres 0,028** 3,346*** 48,358*** 0,025* 4,23*** 63,351*** 0,027** 3,382*** 48,331***
Number of Trees 0,001** 0,046 0,375 0,001 0,095 0,5 0,001** 0,042 0,389
Number of Livestock 0,008*** 0,582** 8,411** 0,002 0,134 5,981* 0,008*** 0,572** 8,437**
Proportion of Land for Sesame -0,006 8,95 122,652 0,023 1,214 136,843 0,101 5,098 143,395
Income from Cash Crops 0*** 0*** 0**
Income from Forest Products 0,001** 0 0,001**
Mean Durables in Village 0,409** -3,416 0,39** -5,582 0,404** -2,811
Mean Income in Village -0,001** 0,799*** -0,001** 0,608* -0,001** 0,785***
Mean Expenditure in Village 1,013*** 0,815 1,044**
N                             693 728 733 397 421 424 693 728 733
R2 Adjusted                          0,142 0,261 0,154 0,236 0,141 0,259
Pseudo R2                          0,126 0,127 0,127
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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We only found a significant (at 95% confidence level) but negative ‘difference-in-difference’ 
estimator for durable assets on column 7 of Table 5, for the comparison between early entry 
villages and control villages. This means that durable assets in early entry villages were 
apparently reduced as a consequence of project activities as compared to those villages that 
did not participate in the project. However, given that all remaining ‘difference-in-difference’ 
coefficients (regardless of whether we compare early and late villages versus control villages, 
and early or late entry villages with control villages) are not statistically significant, we can 
conclude that there is not any robust evidence to attribute significant changes on our 
independent variables to MCDI activities.
3.3. Participation and knowledge effects in project villages
This section turns now to analyse the participation in project activities, and the distribution of 
project monies and related knowledge in project villages. Figure 5 shows how many of the 
household heads surveyed, either men or women, confirmed participation in MCDI activities. 
It is interesting to note that surveyed women participated more often than surveyed men in 
MCDI meetings. We did not find striking gender differences in participation in other 
activities, except for marking boundaries and harvesting timber, which are more physically 
demanding. Again, it was surprising that the frequency of women surveyed in early entry 
villages reporting involvement in early burning activities was higher than men, despite being 
a risky and more labour intense activity. Figure 5 also reflects that people’s engagement in 
MCDI’s most demanding activities is lower than attending meetings, which is logical. It also 
reflects that more time-consuming activities that require training involve fewer people to 
reduce management costs and create specific capacities among certain individuals. 
Figure 6 identifies the percentage of surveyed households acknowledging to have benefitted 
from direct MCDI payments related to project activities, regardless of activity type and the 
gender of the household participant. Average percentages of benefited households are higher 
in early entry villages, which was expected given that MCDI has been operating in these 
villages for longer and have thus conducted a wider variety and number of activities. In late 
entry villages, the percentage of households that have received MCDI-related fees diminishes, 
with Likawage and Mitole showing the lowest percentages. As regards average fees received, 
we observed logical differences in the average value of such fees in early entry villages 
compared to late entry ones, given that the former have participated in more activities on 
average and have been involved in MCDI activities longer. Ngea is an exception to this but 
we cannot explain confidently why, since both Likawage and Ngea have engaged in REDD+ 
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early burning trials in 2011 and 2013, respectively, and have had, at least in theory, the same 
potential access to MCDI-related fees (Figure G in Supplementary Information).
Figure 5. Participation in MCDI activities by household heads, 2011-2014
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Figure 6. Percentage of households who had received direct fees from MCDI activities
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As regards the spread of PFM and project knowledge, we expected that early entry 
households would be more knowledgeable about MCDI project activities, and would also 
perceive these activities more positively in terms of expected benefits. Our findings confirm 
27
this, showing that early entry village respondents are more likely have heard about activities 
and more likely to also be aware of what these activities involve (the measure of awareness 
was based on questions that tested whether key features of activities were understood). 
Knowledge of project activities improved between 2011 and 2014, both for men and women, 
with the exception of Kikole that showed a different direction of change, with a small drop in 
awareness of project activities for men and a larger drop for women. Overall, we also 
observed a gender difference in knowledge and awareness of project activities, with women 
less likely to know about MCDI activities than men for both study years even if they 
apparently participated more often in project meetings (Figure H in Supplementary 
Information).
Finally, we also found that the percentage of late entry village respondents with awareness of 
MCDI activities was lower than for early entry villages. The knowledge of MCDI activities 
had increased between 2011 and 2014, to the point where very few respondents had not heard 
of project activities. This was equally true for female respondents and there was indeed less 
gender difference observed in late entry villages compared to early entry ones. This may be 
attributable to MCDI having placed greater emphasis on gender equality as their working 
practices developed over time (Figure I in Supplementary Information).
4. Discussion 
We started this article arguing that there was a research need for more impact assessment of 
PFM programs and projects, particularly now that these initiatives are likely to be 
increasingly promoted in the context of REDD+ policies and incentives. Evidence in this 
regard is still scarce, with few analyses grounded on panel data and placing emphasis on 
governance and socio-economic issues. Grounded on the experience of the MCDI project in 
Tanzania, we have investigated the project’s effects on village forest governance and local 
livelihoods connecting project activities with their hypothetical outcomes through a set of 
evaluation criteria and indicators. Overall, our results align with those who had previously 
suggested that PFM can transform village-level resource management institutions but deliver 
limited benefits to local households (Gross-Camp 2017; Persha and Meshack 2016).
Our qualitative governance analysis at village level, corroborated with insights from the 
household survey, demonstrates that villages working with MCDI for longer had experienced 
improvements in forest governance, driven in turn by a longer period of support to build their 
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forest governance capacities and by the fact that they had already benefited from timber 
revenues that had contributed to mobilise interest and attention of the community at large 
towards forest management. Notwithstanding, the results also demonstrate that the project 
activities as such have been insufficient to address socially entrenched gender inequities and 
to address very uneven and insufficient access to project information and forest management 
rules and responsibilities across all project villages. 
These findings corroborate earlier studies focused on what it takes to develop well-
functioning PFM and REDD+ projects (Merger et al. 2012; Vatn et al. 2017; Robinson et al. 
2013). It takes considerable time, resources and awareness that when such institutions are in 
place they can still be slow in recognizing fund-management grievances and in making 
decision-making more transparent, gender sensitive and inclusive. Our findings also partly 
align with evidence suggesting that longer-term external support can mitigate the risk of elite 
capture in forest communities (Persha and Andersson 2014), but also suggest the potential 
existence of critical socio-cultural barriers that might require longer timespans to be 
overcome. 
Findings related to changes in households’ material wellbeing yield some interesting but 
inconclusive results. MCDI participating villages had, on average, more durable assets than 
control villages but the effect of project activities on these assets was negative (i.e. we found a 
decrease in assets relative to control villages over the study period). As regards income, and 
looking at simple descriptive statistics, it appears that MCDI project villages have done much 
better than control villages, with comparatively substantial gains between 2011 and 2014, 
even when adjusted for inflation. These recorded income gains are also supported by our 
respondents’ more subjective assessment of changes in their household economy across years, 
with MCDI village respondents much more likely to report improvements in their household 
situation than control villages. 
However, whilst our descriptive statistics have shown that income has increased in MCDI 
villages relative to control villages, the difference-in-difference analysis finds that this is not 
statistically significant. We think that this result arises, first and foremost, from the fact that 
village economies are much larger than just forestry, and market-based income is dominated 
by sales of sesame and other cash crops such as cashew, as reported for other parts of 
Tanzania (Brockington 2016). It is hard to isolate the effect of increasing forest incomes 
given that these changes are dwarfed by wider economic transitions occurring across all 
villages. In fact, this leads us to underscore the importance of analysing PFM and REDD+ 
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outcomes beyond project boundaries and focusing instead on the broader forest-agriculture 
landscapes where these activities are often located and where environmental and economic 
conditions might change significantly from year to year. In our particular case, we have 
presented evidence that a boom in sesame farming has been driving village economies in the 
region, thus overshadowing the effects of any possible income-related effects of MCDI 
activities in early entry villages. Under such circumstances, PFM may promote new and more 
equitable income streams, particularly for those who cannot mobilize the capital or labor to 
participate in cash cropping, but it is unlikely to be a driver of livelihood transformation.
Secondly, we think that many of the pathways to household economic benefits in project 
villages are indirect, through investment in public goods such as improved water provision, 
healthcare and schooling. These are long-term investments geared towards building important 
and flexible assets related to human capital. It is quite expected that it would take a longer 
period of time to see these effects materialise. Third, we must also acknowledge that there are 
significant challenges to collecting very accurate data with consistency across years. This was 
perhaps most evident in the highly surprising data on income from harvested forest goods. We 
found a massive increase in use of forest resources for income generation and we could seek 
to explain this as a use of forests as a safety net given the collapse of sales of maize, millet 
and rice due largely to drought, as well as an increase in villagers’ reporting confidence. 
As regards the project’s equity effects, including the fair distribution of project benefits and 
costs across households, our analysis of changes to income distribution within villages using a 
Gini coefficient reveals small rises in inequality across both MCDI villages and control 
villages. We speculate that this concentration of income, such that a higher proportion of total 
village income is concentrated in the wealthier households, is again explained by boom in the 
sesame cash crop economy. As hinted above, the income that can be gained from sesame 
presents a significant opportunity to those households who command the labour and working 
capital to invest in expanded production, which widens the income gap with those who do not 
control the assets to expand sesame production. This explanation would fit the pattern we 
have seen with asset counts, in which those with few assets to begin with have failed to 
improve their position. This explanation would also be somewhat supported by the 
observation that early entry villages are the ones who have most expanded their cash crop 
income and have also most increased their inequality, although we recognise that this would 
need further research to confirm it. Regarding knowledge of forest management operations, 
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we find that the MCDI project has had a positive impact, which has been captured by the 
household survey but not so much through the focus group activities.
5. Conclusions 
This article aimed to investigate the effects of a project that combines PFM efforts with 
REDD+ finance on forest governance and rural livelihoods. We have demonstrated that 
MCDI activities have led to improvements in forest governance and related knowledge within 
project villages, although there is room for improvement in several of the governance criteria 
and indicators explored, as well as in the way forest management and project knowledge is 
disseminated, which should ideally avoid relying only on the new established institutions for 
its dissemination. In this regard, we have argued that the continuous and sustained 
involvement of MCDI at village level is key, as demonstrated by the fact that institutions were 
more robust and knowledge more fairly distributed within those villages where the project 
had been operating for longer. Furthermore, such long-term commitment to the project 
villages is the only possible pathway to deliver on its promises about sustainable income 
gains, through timber and carbon offsets, and rural development more generally. It is either 
this or becoming indeed another “conservation fad” (Lund et al. 2017).
With regards the project’s effects on local livelihoods, our results are inconclusive. We cannot 
suggest with confidence that the project has been the main driver of positive changes in 
household income, assets and expenditure levels. Neither we can say that observed increases 
in inequality in some villages and the material impoverishment of some households have been 
caused by the project. To move towards a more conclusive understanding of change, MCDI 
and/with independent researchers would need to monitor change over a longer period, 
continue to improve the quality of data collection, and in an ideal world, enhance sample sizes 
and spatial reach. 
In this regard, we recognize that collecting detailed household livelihood and income panel 
data is costly and time consuming, and that neither ourselves nor MCDI might be able in the 
future to continue such recurrent data collection process. In this case, the main way of 
developing a long-term impact evaluation strategy might be to rely on existing government or 
international datasets if existent or developed, or to concentrate on identifying relatively 
simply but locally appropriate livelihood indicators that might be impacted directly or 
indirectly by project activities, such as (weighted) indices of durable assets, and innovative 
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measures that capture the pathways by which public goods spending benefits individual 
household economies. Any survey-based approach will have to be accompanied by improved 
understandings of project and non-project villages realities, for example through ethnographic 
work, to develop a more robust understanding of the project’s impact pathways at collective 
and household levels, and to be able to interpret panel data analysis in further detail.
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Supplementary Information
Table A. Village governance criteria, questions and scoring thresholds
Scoring thresholds
Criteria and Indicators
+ ~ -
1. User Organisation & Cohesion
A. Is there a PFM group in the village and, if so, is everyone involved? All included Almost all Exclusions or no group
B. Does everyone in the village participate in the VNRC activities (including meetings)? [for villages where 
this applies]
Are all the legitimate forest users included in the PFM Group, and does the Council take into account the 
needs of all legitimate forest users?
Yes Mixed No
C. Does the Village Council take into account the needs of all legitimate forest users? Yes Mixed No
D. Whose forest is it? Is there a sense of ownership of forest amongst villagers? Strong Moderate Weak
E. What do you do when outsiders enter your forests illegally? Do you assert control (i.e. obstruct / apprehend 
/ punish?)
Challenge & 
exclude 
Moderate 
efforts Open access 
F. Do all the villagers who use the forest cooperate in looking after the forest? Most-all (>2/3) united
Many (1/3-
2/3) Few (<1/3)
2. Communication & Awareness
A. Are all forest users fully aware what PFM is about and who is or should be involved? [for villages where 
this applies]
Most-all 
(>2/3)
Many (1/3-
2/3) Few (<1/3):  -
B. Are users aware of roles & responsibilities regarding the use and conservation of the village forest? Fully Somewhat Not
C. Does the community know what REDD+ is? [new question in 2014 when REDD+ had already been 
introduced] [for villages where this applies] Fully Somewhat Not
D. Did all villagers understand the Mpingo REDD project contract and agree to it? [for villages where this 
applies] Most-all
Some / 
majority None-few  
3. Decision-making & Implementation*
A. Is there regular committee & assembly interaction? Eg. How many village general assembly meetings were 
held last year? Very good 4 
Medium-good 
2-3 Poor 0-1
B. Do ordinary villagers attend general assembly discussions? Most: >⅔ Moderate: ⅓ to ⅔, Few: <⅓
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C. Is the decision making inclusive of whole village community?  Eg Number of people not in leadership 
positions recorded as speaking in general assembly? Good > 10 Medium 5-10 Poor 0- 4
D. Does each sub-village have discussions contributing to the Village Council and/or General Assembly? Yes Somewhat  No
E. Are the specific concerns of the different sub-villages considered in general village meetings? Yes Somewhat: No
F. Are the agreed decisions at the Village Council, the General Assembly (and/or the VNRC meetings) 
actually implemented?  [Check last year’s record book] Most: >⅔
Moderate: ⅓ 
to ⅔, Few: <⅓
G. Is there any political interference / factionalism affecting forest management? No Somewhat Yes
H. Communication – are decisions taken in the Village Council, the General Assembly (and/or the VNRC 
meetings) clearly communicated – eg through a notice-board? [New question in 2014] No Somewhat Yes
4. Forest Management
A. What percentage of the village forest reserve boundary is marked? [for villages where this applies] >95% 25-95% 0-25%
B. How has the village forest reserve changed over the last 5 years? [for villages where this applies] Improving Stable unchanging Deteriorating
C. How have the other village forests changed in the last 5 years? [for villages where this applies] Improving Stable unchanging Deteriorating
D. Is the forest protection effective? Eg. Enforcement of management plan measures; protection against 
outsiders extracting, timber felling, grazing, fire etc. Fully effective Moderately No
E. Do you have a forest management plan? If so to what extent implemented? Fully implemented
Partly 
implemented
Not 
implemented 
5. Forest Product Access & Distribution
A. Are villagers’ household forest product needs met? Eg. fuelwood, fodder, any other basic needs Easily fulfilled Hard but possible
Difficult or not 
possible
B. Can villagers still easily collect/harvest forest products for sale/business?** Easily Moderate Difficult
C. Can villagers’ use the forest equally? Or do some villagers or outsiders have preferential access for some 
reason? (may include bushmeat)
Fair  / pro-
local
Moderately 
fair
Unfairly pro-
outside
D. Are forest products used sustainably or are they declining? (ie. all forest products from surrounding forests) Stocks secure Moderate stocks / at risk
Stocks 
declining  
6. Gender and Equity Considerations
A. Do women actively participate in village meetings? What is the % of comments coming from women in the 
Village Council and the Village General Assembly (and/or the VNRC)? >33% 10% < 33% <10%
B. Are the rights, duties, punishments the same for everyone? Yes always Mostly No, unfair
C. Are the needs of the families that depend more on the forest, either formally or informally (eg. charcoal makers, 
timber harvesters, honey producers, etc.) specifically considered in forest management and use?
Favourable 
consideration Somewhat No
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7. Economic / Fund development
A. Is the use of the forest generating cash for the village? If so, what are the sources of this cash? Significant Modest No
B. Is the money obtained from the village forests for the benefit of the community managed transparently by 
village authorities (and the VNRC)? 
Full 
transparency 
& general 
knowledge
Some 
understanding  Unclear
C. Is the use of money coming from forest use agreed openly by everyone in the Village Council or the Village 
General Assembly?
Very 
democratic Moderate Unclear
D. What % of forest management incomes / profits are used for community development? Significant (45% or more)
Modest 
(<45%) None
8. Conflict Management
A. Are there any disputes among community members and/or between community members and the government 
regarding forest management? No Moderate Significant
B. Are the conflicts discussed above managed and resolved effectively? Effectively managed Moderately Poorly
9. Linkage and Network development
A. Are the regional or national forestry departments supportive and helpful? Eg. Have they offered training for 
sustainable forest management/backup for enforcing rules? Helpful Neutral
Cause 
problems
B. Does your village work with other organisations related to forest management? Eg. Non-governmental 
organisations, logging companies, etc. Good links Moderate None-Poor
C. How beneficial is the relationship of the village with these other stakeholders for the management of your 
forest?
Very 
satisfactory Satisfactory Not very 
D. How is the VNRC’s relationship with the Village Executive Officer? [for villages where this applies]
Friendly and 
cooperative: 
proactive 
support given
Moderate: 
basic 
cooperation 
with no 
significant 
disputes
Poor: non-
cooperative 
and/or 
significant 
disputes
* In future assessments this could be usefully split into 3 sub-criteria for VNRC, VC and VGA, which may show varying results, and which would be interesting to track 
separately. Some institutions might be more dysfunctional than others.
** Note the answer may properly be ‘difficult’, since commercial use of the forest is regulated.
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Table B. Average subsistence crops income (Tsh) by village group, village and year (mean, standard deviation and sample size, 
respectively). 2014 data deflated using Consumer Price Index changes
Summary Results (Tsh) Village Mean (Tsh)
Group
2011 2014 Village 2011 2014
Early Entry 8,861(± 36,068, n=111)
0
(± 0, n=101)
Kikole
Kisangi
Liwiti
Nainokwe
11,422
13,051
12,000
0
0
0
0
0
Late Entry 9,505(± 34,873, n=136)
0
(± 0, n=123)
Likawage
Mandawa
Mchakama
Mitole
Ngea
15,200
0
14,482
11,309
5,000
0
0
0
0
0
Control 8,140(± 34,468, n=171)
460
(± 3.37, n=164)
Mbwemkuru
Mtandi
Mtyalambuko
Nakiu
Nandete
Ngorongoro
0
2,000
14,896
11,000
21,923
0
0
0
2,694
0
0
0
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Table C. Average cash crop income (Tsh) by village group, village and year (mean, standard deviation and N, respectively). 2014 data 
deflated using Consumer Price Index changes
Summary Results (Tsh) Village Mean (Tsh)
Group
2011 2014 Village 2011 2014
Early Entry 317,645(± 351,585 n=111)
484,033
(± 582,845, n=93)
Kikole
Kisangi
Liwiti
Nainokwe
454,250
223,071
370,920
234,020
565,800
543,168
671,416
190,234
Late Entry 316,995(± 450,568, n=135)
454,039
(± 551,029, n=120)
Likawage
Mandawa
Mchakama
Mitole
Ngea
526,052
380,370
175,710
291,948
161,900
641,240
565,800
369,656
475,272
188,600
Control 286,204(± 413,774, n=170)
271,837
(± 412,089, n=161)
Mbwemkuru
Mtandi
Mtyalambuko
Nakiu
Nandete
Ngorongoro
318,846
385,779
201,862
518,952
124,071
165,500
445,096
226,320
181,056
505,448
90,528
105,616 
38
Table D. Correlations between proportion of cultivated sesame and cashew, and household total income and total agricultural income
Total income Total agricultural income
2011 2014 2011 2014
Village Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation
Kikole Non Sig. 0,50 0,37 0,65
Kisangi 0,47 Non Sig. 0,48 Non Sig.
Liwiti Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig.
Early Entry
Nainokwe Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig.
Likawage 0,44 Non Sig. 0,51 0,44
Mandawa 0,32 Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig.
Mchakama Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig.
Mitole 0,43 Non Sig. 0,42 Non Sig.
Late Entry
Ngea 0,51 Non Sig. 0,49 Non Sig.
Mbwemkuru 0,42 Non Sig. 0,44 Non Sig.
Mtandi 0,37 Non Sig. 0,42 Non Sig.
Mtyalambuko Non Sig. 0,37 Non Sig. Non Sig.
Nakiu Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig. Non Sig.
Nandete Non Sig. 0,61 Non Sig. 0,57
Controls
Ngorongoro 0,45 0,67 Non Sig. 0,68
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Table E. Average forest products cash income (Tsh) by village group, village and year (mean, standard deviation and N, respectively). 
2014 data deflated using Consumer Price Index changes
Summary Results (Tsh) Village Mean (Tsh)
Group
2011 2014 Village 2011 2014
Early Entry 2,072(± 7,810, n=113)
33,291
(± 90,528, n=91)
Kikole
Kisangi
Liwiti
Nainokwe
2,167
2,393
1,200
2,403
75,440
3,018
24,168
36,117
Late Entry 2,375(± 15,042, n=136)
26,564
(± 65,212, n=123)
Likawage
Mandawa
Mchakama
Mitole
Ngea
10,500
0
0
0
400
32,410
34,325
16,341
7,183
45,471
Control 925(± 9,327, n=173)
37,925
(± 75,440, n=159)
Mbwemkuru
Mtandi
Mtyalambuko
Nakiu
Nandete
Ngorongoro
4,615
333
1,034
0
0
0
67,173
50,935
37,427
29,292
13,611
31,114
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Figure F. Gini coefficient (without outliers) by village and year
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Figure G. Average MCDI-related fees (in Tsh) by participant village
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Figure H. Household head members’ knowledge of MCDI activities in early entry villages, by gender
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Figure I. Household head members' knowledge of MCDI activities in late entry villages, by gender
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